Peace Treaty or Ceasefire? The Security Policy Quadrature of the Circle in the Ukraine War @ZelenskyyUa @realDonaldTrump @bundeskanzler

A peace agreement between Ukraine and Russia would be more than a diplomatic ritual – it would mark a geopolitical turning point with immediate consequences for Europe’s security architecture. Yet this pivotal role is precisely where the complexity lies: any agreement would need to be militarily credible, politically viable, and legally indisputable. The mistakes of Minsk must not be repeated.

Lessons from Minsk

The Minsk Agreement was a fragile construct from the outset. Its sequencing of commitments – political concessions first, security measures later – gave Moscow the opportunity to exert constant pressure without ever delivering substantial countermeasures. Ukraine remained trapped in a limbo: too weak to enforce conditions, too constrained to openly reject them. For Kyiv it is therefore clear: any new accord must not contain the same “hidden traps” that Russia could exploit to gain a military advantage.

Ceasefire versus Peace

According to Gustav C. Gressel, military expert at the Austrian National Defence Academy in Vienna, a permanent peace treaty during active combat operations is an illusion. Without a ceasefire, any negotiation becomes fiction. Peace, in his assessment, requires time – time to build structures, shape credible guarantees, and underpin trust through verifiable measures.

A ceasefire is a necessary, though insufficient, condition. It must not be confused with an end state, but rather serve as a bridge – one that may collapse as easily as it is built.

Security Guarantees: NATO, Bilateral Agreements, or Empty Shell?

The core question remains: what kind of security guarantees could both deter Russia and provide Ukraine with stability?

  • NATO membership would be the most robust solution, yet politically explosive, as Moscow portrays it as a casus belli.
  • Bilateral guarantees are weaker. As Gressel notes, they lack the compulsion of a collective defense alliance: a state can ignore a pledge if its own security is not directly at stake. Russia is fully aware of this and has sought to insert clauses effectively granting it veto power over Western responses.
  • Hybrid models – such as the stationing of European troops in Ukraine – carry their own risks. Would an attack on a German brigade stationed in Ukraine be considered an attack on Germany itself? Only U.S. backing could answer such questions credibly. Gressel identifies this as one of the decisive “gigantic details” for any workable arrangement.

Territorial Questions: The Insoluble Puzzle

Without addressing territorial issues, no treaty can be complete. Moscow insists on recognition of its territorial gains, while Kyiv rejects this outright. Models of “non-recognition with factual standstill” do exist, but any official cession would be political suicide for the Ukrainian leadership. At best, compromises in the form of unresolved status questions appear conceivable – but they would merely postpone, not resolve, the conflict.

What a Serious Treaty Would Require

A viable peace agreement would have to combine three levels:

  1. Military: stationed protection forces, joint maneuvers, adoption of NATO standards – without these, any guarantee is mere paper.
  2. Political: clear sequencing of concessions to avoid a new “Minsk-2 syndrome.”
  3. Diplomatic: close involvement of the United States, since only Washington can provide the nuclear backstop that Europe needs to make Russia take guarantees seriously.

Conclusion: Realism, Not Illusion

Current negotiations, as Gressel lucidly observes, suffer from a dangerous confusion: leaders such as Donald Trump speak of “peace” when they should speak of “ceasefire.” To negotiate “peace” without a security architecture, guarantees, and credible force projection is to negotiate the end of Ukraine – not the end of the war.

The challenge for politics, military, and industry lies not in the temptation of a quick piece of paper, but in the painstaking work of detail: infrastructure, troop presence, escalation scenarios, nuclear backstops. Only then could a ceasefire evolve into genuine peace – and not into another interlude on the path to Russia’s next offensive.

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