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Peace Treaty or Ceasefire? The Security Policy Quadrature of the Circle in the Ukraine War @ZelenskyyUa @realDonaldTrump @bundeskanzler

A peace agreement between Ukraine and Russia would be more than a diplomatic ritual – it would mark a geopolitical turning point with immediate consequences for Europe’s security architecture. Yet this pivotal role is precisely where the complexity lies: any agreement would need to be militarily credible, politically viable, and legally indisputable. The mistakes of Minsk must not be repeated.

Lessons from Minsk

The Minsk Agreement was a fragile construct from the outset. Its sequencing of commitments – political concessions first, security measures later – gave Moscow the opportunity to exert constant pressure without ever delivering substantial countermeasures. Ukraine remained trapped in a limbo: too weak to enforce conditions, too constrained to openly reject them. For Kyiv it is therefore clear: any new accord must not contain the same “hidden traps” that Russia could exploit to gain a military advantage.

Ceasefire versus Peace

According to Gustav C. Gressel, military expert at the Austrian National Defence Academy in Vienna, a permanent peace treaty during active combat operations is an illusion. Without a ceasefire, any negotiation becomes fiction. Peace, in his assessment, requires time – time to build structures, shape credible guarantees, and underpin trust through verifiable measures.

A ceasefire is a necessary, though insufficient, condition. It must not be confused with an end state, but rather serve as a bridge – one that may collapse as easily as it is built.

Security Guarantees: NATO, Bilateral Agreements, or Empty Shell?

The core question remains: what kind of security guarantees could both deter Russia and provide Ukraine with stability?

Territorial Questions: The Insoluble Puzzle

Without addressing territorial issues, no treaty can be complete. Moscow insists on recognition of its territorial gains, while Kyiv rejects this outright. Models of “non-recognition with factual standstill” do exist, but any official cession would be political suicide for the Ukrainian leadership. At best, compromises in the form of unresolved status questions appear conceivable – but they would merely postpone, not resolve, the conflict.

What a Serious Treaty Would Require

A viable peace agreement would have to combine three levels:

  1. Military: stationed protection forces, joint maneuvers, adoption of NATO standards – without these, any guarantee is mere paper.
  2. Political: clear sequencing of concessions to avoid a new “Minsk-2 syndrome.”
  3. Diplomatic: close involvement of the United States, since only Washington can provide the nuclear backstop that Europe needs to make Russia take guarantees seriously.

Conclusion: Realism, Not Illusion

Current negotiations, as Gressel lucidly observes, suffer from a dangerous confusion: leaders such as Donald Trump speak of “peace” when they should speak of “ceasefire.” To negotiate “peace” without a security architecture, guarantees, and credible force projection is to negotiate the end of Ukraine – not the end of the war.

The challenge for politics, military, and industry lies not in the temptation of a quick piece of paper, but in the painstaking work of detail: infrastructure, troop presence, escalation scenarios, nuclear backstops. Only then could a ceasefire evolve into genuine peace – and not into another interlude on the path to Russia’s next offensive.

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